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FOREWORD: HOW TO THINK ABOUT 
LAW AND MARKETS 
JOSEPH BLOCHER AND KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
We started the Law and Markets Project at Duke Law School in the summer 
of 2015 in an effort to better understand the relationship between the legal system 
on the one hand and markets on the other. That relationship is central to 
understanding the nature and practical impact of legal rules, the degree to which 
those rules are shaped by economic forces, and the ways in which law and markets 
should or can operate independently. Further, it inevitably raises foundational 
and difficult questions. What are (or should be) the limits of markets? When, and 
through what mechanisms, should the law restrict the free exchange of goods and 
services? To what extent, and how, should the legal system address market driven 
inequalities in income, wealth, or access to goods and services like health care 
and education? 
By addressing these questions, we hoped to generate interesting 
conversations that would deepen people’s understandings of their own and each 
other’s work and set the stage for collaboration going forward. We chose to focus 
our efforts on the Duke community, so as to help build those conversations and 
relationships. Given our colleagues’ broad and deep substantive and 
methodological expertise, this hardly felt like a limitation. 
This breadth of expertise quickly became apparent during the first stage of 
the Project: a summer discussion series in which colleagues helped lead 
conversations about classic works and debates in law and markets1—from the 
foundational debate over altruism and markets in Richard Titmuss’s The Gift 
Relationship,2 to the role of markets as engines for development in Amartya Sen’s 
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* Duke Law School. This symposium issue is the culmination of the Law & Markets Project at Duke
Law School, which was possible thanks only to the generous support of Dean David Levi and the 
enthusiasm and dedication of our colleagues and students. We are grateful to all of them. More 
information about the Project can be found at https://law.duke.edu/lawmarkets/. 
1. For a full list of readings, see The Duke Project on Law & Markets, Readings and Resources,
https://law.duke.edu/lawmarkets/readings/ [https://perma.cc/Z5ZY-6XM2]. 
2.  See generally RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1970) (contrasting voluntary
and compensated systems of blood donation, and arguing that a nonmarket, altruistic system may be 
more effective in some ways). For two leading responses, see generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and 
Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972); Peter Singer, Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss 
Against Arrow, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 312 (1973). 
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Development as Freedom,3 to the relationship between the constitutional status 
of corporations and Milton Friedman’s The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase Its Profits.4 We particularly thank our colleagues Jonathan Wiener, 
Barak Richman, Wayne Norman, Sam Buell, and Rachel Brewster for leading 
the discussions, which were enlightening, engaging, and occasionally involved 
pointed disagreement. 
The conversations continued throughout the year with a seminar and 
colloquium, which gave us a chance to bring in outside scholars—including Alvin 
Roth, co-recipient of the 2012 Nobel Prize for Economics—whose work 
addresses the relationship of law and markets from a variety of substantive, 
moral, and methodological angles.5 Our colleagues and students provided 
probing questions.6 We provided food and wine. 
The seminar speakers included Guy Charles (Duke), Maggie Lemos (Duke), 
Kara W. Swanson (Northeastern), Jason Brennan (Georgetown), Larry Zelenak 
(Duke), John Michaels (UCLA), Katherine Bartlett (Duke), Mitu Gulati 
(Duke), Mario Macis (Johns Hopkins), Frank Dobbin (Harvard), Marcia 
Yablon-Zug (South Carolina), James Hathaway (Michigan), Alvin Roth 
(Stanford), and Lisa Griffin (Duke). They presented articles and book chapters 
on bride-selling,7 the history of selling body parts,8 the tax implications of selling 
body parts,9 the moral limits (if any) of markets,10 kidney exchanges,11 common 
but differentiated responsibility for refugees,12 discrimination by customers,13 
 
 3.  See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (describing development as 
a series of linked freedoms, including economic freedom). 
 4.  See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. As a means of framing Friedman’s argument, we also discussed Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (Winter 2014/15). 
 5.  For an accessible introduction to market design, including but not limited to Roth’s own 
contributions, see Alvin E. Roth, Who Gets What - and Why: The Hidden World of Matchmaking and 
Market Design (2016). 
 6.  The students who signed up for the yearlong course were Trevor Chenoweth, Christian Coyne, 
Theodore Edwards, Alex Joseph, Alisha Mehta, Sanaz Oskouy, Marcelo Prates, Matthew Skrzynski, and 
Andrew Whitworth. We thank them for their participation and contributions. 
 7.  See generally MARCIA YABLON-ZUG, BUYING A BRIDE: AN ENGAGING HISTORY OF MAIL 
ORDER MATCHES (2016). 
 8.  See generally KARA SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK, AND 
SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA (2014). 
 9.  See generally Lawrence Zelenak, The Body in Question: The Income Tax and Human Body 
Materials, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 10.  See generally JASON BRENNAN & PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS: MORAL 
VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS (2015). 
 11.  See generally Afshin Nikzad, Financing Transplant Costs of the Poor: A Dynamic Model of 
Global Kidney Exchange (Working Paper, Jan. 2016). 
 12.  See generally James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law 
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
115 (1997). 
 13.  See generally Katherine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. 
REV 223 (2016).   
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running government like a business,14 the market dimensions of plea bargaining,15 
empirical research on the effect of financial incentives on blood collection,16 and 
derivatives trading.17 
We had every reason to expect good things, because ours was not the first 
such initiative at Duke. In the summer of 2011, our colleagues Curt Bradley and 
Mitu Gulati launched the Custom and Law Project, which brought together 
scholars within and without the law school to discuss the influence of custom on 
law.18 They were, as we are, fortunate to have extraordinary support from Dean 
David Levi, who made both Projects possible. The Custom and Law Project 
included faculty discussions, workshops, a seminar, and culminated in the spring 
of 2012 with an excellent symposium.19 
Following a similar approach, and confident of similar success, we held a 
symposium in early May 2016, the proceedings of which are collected in this issue. 
Duke faculty authored or co-authored all of the pieces, and the breadth of the 
topics demonstrates some of the many facets of the relationship between law and 
markets—from the sale (and tax treatment of) body parts20 to moral economies 
in the early Chinese land market;21 from the supply and demand of anticorruption 
enforcement22 to evaluating financial regulation;23 from markets and the 
environment24 to markets for sovereignty itself.25  
Neither the articles individually nor the symposium as a whole attempt to 
precisely define or fully describe the relationship between law and markets. Nor 
did we necessarily set out to identify new perspectives on the matter. But despite 
their different subjects and their varying economic, legal, political, and even 
moral suppositions, the papers engage some non-obvious themes and show a 
variety of ways to think about law and markets. 
 
 14.  See generally JON D. MICHAELS, THE SECOND PRIVATIZATION REVOLUTION: THE 
UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (forthcoming, Harvard University Press). 
 15.  See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, State Incentives, Plea Bargaining Regulation, and the Failed 
Market for Indigent Defense, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 16.  See generally Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood Donations, 340 SCI. 
927 (2013).  
 17.  See generally Kim Pernell et al., The Rise of Risky Derivatives: Chief Risk Officers, CEOs, and 
Fund Managers (University of Toronto Department of Sociology, Working Paper, 2016). 
 18.  See generally DUKE LAW, The Duke Project on Custom and Law, 
https://law.duke.edu/customlaw [https://perma.cc/M883-B7U2]. 
 19.  See generally Special Symposium, The Duke Project on Custom and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 3 (2012). 
 20.  See generally Zelenak, supra note 9. 
 21.  See generally Taisu Zhang, Moral Economies in Early Modern Land Markets: History and 
Theory, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 22.  See generally Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The Market for Global Anticorruption 
Enforcement, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 23.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to Address Changing Markets: A Consequence-
Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 24.  See generally Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring Pope 
Francis’ Challenge, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017. 
 25.  See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 1, 2017. 
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II 
LAW AND NEW OR UNEXPECTED MARKETS 
One of the most common initial questions we received about the Project was, 
“Well, what about X? Isn’t that a market?” Indeed, one of the foundational 
questions we confronted throughout the year is what constitutes a market, and—
somewhat to our surprise—we found that project participants tended to share 
expansive definitions and intuitions. 
Nevertheless, the boundaries of permissible market activity tend to raise 
particularly difficult questions, not just definitionally, but also for law. Changes 
in technology, social norms, and even law itself often give rise to—or at least 
generate demand for—new markets and market mechanisms, which in turn 
present novel challenges. Where exchange is technically forbidden, how can and 
should law protect the interests of the would-be transactors? When parties 
engage in exchanges that look like market activity, how should the tax system 
treat them? And when the deal is not self-consciously a market transaction—as 
in the case of plea bargaining26—how can the market frame help make sense of 
party incentives, particularly in response to legal change? Such questions lie at 
the heart of the papers by Kim Krawiec, Wenhao Liu, and Marc Melcher; Larry 
Zelenak; and Lisa Griffin. 
Building on their prior work,27 and combining different scholarly and practical 
perspectives, Krawiec, Liu (Stanford—Department of Management Science and 
Engineering), and Melcher (Stanford—Department of Surgery) analyze kidney 
exchange as a matching market. In doing so, they detail the development of 
kidney exchange from straightforward barter-type arrangements in which formal 
contract is of little relevance because exchange is simultaneous, to more complex 
intertemporal exchanges that pose risks to both transplant centers and donors. 
Their article focuses specifically on a new transplant innovation—Advanced 
Donation, referred to by some as a kidney gift certificate, layaway plan, or 
voucher—as a case study offering insights on both market and contract 
development. Advanced Donation provides an unusual window into the 
evolution of the exchange of a single good—a kidney for transplantation—from 
gift, to simple barter, to exchange with a temporal separation of obligations that 
relies solely on trust and reputational constraints for enforcement, to a complex 
matching market in which the parties rely, at least in part, on formal contract to 
define and clarify their obligations to each other. 
However, the transplant community has historically viewed formal contracts 
in the transplant setting with suspicion, and that traditional suspicion remains 
evident in current Advanced Donation practice. Krawiec, Liu, and Melcher 
conclude that the use of formal contracts in Advanced Donation is likely 
inadvertent, and the contracts, in a number of ways, are inadequate to tackle the  
 
 
 26.  See generally Griffin, supra note 15. 
 27.  See generally Wenhao Liu et al., Is Informed Consent Enough?, 16 AM. J. TRANS. 1038 (2016). 
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complex, non-simultaneous exchange of kidneys in which a patient donates a 
kidney before their intended recipient has been matched with a potential donor. 
Larry Zelenak’s paper focuses on another legal aspect of the trade in human 
body materials—their tax treatment.28 This presents a particularly difficult 
challenge for tax law, he shows, because even basic elements of the analysis are 
ill-suited to the task. How is one to determine the holding period for body 
materials, given the different rates at which they grow and regenerate? Should 
blood be treated differently than hair, because it is so short-lived? And should 
the basis in those materials be zero, fair market value, or something else entirely? 
Zelenak disclaims having “one true answer”29 either to the best interpretation 
of current law or to the most appropriate legislative reforms. He demonstrates, 
however, that some answers—including those that have been adopted by courts 
in prominent cases—are unsatisfying, and he suggests better alternatives. In 
doing so, Zelenak shows that the important and growing market in human body 
parts not only raises difficult interpretive questions, but exposes key structural 
tensions in the federal income tax. As is true for many of the articles, then, 
exploration of a particular market-based problem sheds light on more general 
challenges for the substantive legal doctrine itself. 
Whereas Zelenak focuses on how existing legal principles can or should 
respond to a new development in the outside world, Lisa Griffin takes the inverse 
approach, asking how a widespread practice in criminal law will respond, in 
market terms, to a change in constitutional law.30 She is specifically interested in 
the political economy of plea bargaining, which scholars have long analyzed in 
market terms. With some oversimplification, the basic notion is that defendants 
trade something of value to them (the right to go to trial) and the state gives them 
something in return (a theoretically lessened sentence). There is, of course, a 
lively debate about whether this is a fair or acceptable market. Griffin adduces 
some evidence that it is not. 
Her main focus, however, is how that market—and especially the state actors 
who fund all the main players—will respond to the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Lafler v. Cooper31 and Missouri v. Frye.32 Those decisions treat plea 
bargaining as a critical stage of the criminal justice process (which it is, as Griffin 
shows), and raise the bar for constitutionally effective counsel by clarifying their 
duty to inform defendants of plea bargains and counsel them about whether to 
accept. Griffin suggests that states now face a new set of constraints and 
incentives—in order to continue prosecutions as before, they will need to 
dedicate more funds to public defense. That, Griffin argues, could have positive 
systemic effects. 
 
 28.  See generally Zelenak, supra note 9. 
 29.  Id. at 38–39. 
 30.  See generally Griffin, supra note 15. 
 31.  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 32.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
BLOCHERKRAWIECINTRO_FORMATTED_PROOFPAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2017  9:14 AM 
6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80:1 
III 
MORALS, MARKETS, AND INSTRUMENT DESIGN 
The relationship between morals and markets has been a matter of debate for 
as long as either concept has been recognized, from Adam Smith’s The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments33 on through contemporary debates about privatization,34 
commodification,35 and neoliberalism.36 In most cases, the question goes beyond 
the simplistic and unanswerable “Morals or markets?” and includes a more 
concrete evaluation of the moral limits—if any—on markets, and the degree to 
which markets and morals can explain one another. 
Historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and others interested in the 
evolution of law have long debated whether there are certain moral economies 
that restrain the reach of the market, for example by supporting the use of law 
and custom to render certain goods impossible to commodify. In his article, Taisu 
Zhang addresses one particularly prominent area of this debate: the common 
argument that many pre-industrial societies failed to develop markets in land 
because they rejected the modern notion that selling land is morally permissible.37 
Surveying the development of land markets throughout Chinese history, 
Zhang finds little support for this moral economy thesis. He also casts doubt on 
whether it could hold true for the histories of England, Japan, and parts of 
Southeast Asia. Moving from specific histories to the frame of the moral 
economy debate as a whole, Zhang argues that proponents of the thesis may have 
been focused on the wrong contexts all along. 
In their article, Jonas Monast, Brian Murray, and Jonathan Wiener address a 
contemporary version of this moral economies debate in the context of a uniquely 
pressing policy question—climate change—and in response to a particularly 
prominent critic.38 In the papal encyclical Laudato Si, Pope Francis specifically 
criticized “the strategy of buying and selling ‘carbon credits.’”39 The Pope’s  
 
 
 33.  See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759). Smith’s “moral sentiments” 
include but are not limited to what we tend to think of as “morality.” The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
provided much of the intellectual architecture for 1776’s Wealth of Nations, as well as a more nuanced 
view of the role of regulation than is generally credited to Smith. 
 34.  See generally MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD (2002); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003); 
Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 
(2002); Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of 
Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001). 
 35.  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) 
(exploring, inter alia, commodification objection to market alienability). 
 36.  See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (Fall 2015). 
 37.  See generally Zhang, supra note 21. 
 38.  See generally Monast et al., supra note 24. 
 39.  POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI: ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME 126 (2015), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_encic 
lica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBW7-8WDQ]. 
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criticism engages a long-running debate about the ethical, moral, and practical 
desirability of using markets to address climate change. 
But, as Monast, Murray, and Wiener show, the question is not simply one of 
morals or markets. Even the Pope’s encyclical can be understood as a statement 
only against certain kinds of free markets. And, once one identifies the many 
different versions of the moral arguments against markets, it becomes easier to 
ask—as Monast, Murray, and Wiener do—how carbon markets might be 
designed to address them. 
Steven Schwarcz’s article directly addresses the question implicit in many 
discussions of law and markets: whether and how the former should be used to 
regulate the latter.40 This question is especially salient in the context of financial 
markets, which are Schwarcz’s focus. One traditional way to evaluate potential 
regulation is using cost–benefit analysis. However, Schwarcz contends that this 
traditional approach could be improved by an increased focus on what he calls 
consequence-based inquiry. 
Schwarcz argues that consequence-based inquiry would differ from some 
versions of cost–benefit analysis in that it would focus not only on the how but 
the when of regulation, providing lawmakers with a framework for determining 
when intervention is warranted in the first place. It would also focus on a 
particular market failure, rather than evaluating the costs and benefits of a 
presumptive regulation (a process that raises risks of confirmation bias). 
Consequence-based inquiry would identify a market change, ask whether it 
causes any market failures (Schwarcz suggests that changes in the bond market 
might qualify, for example), and then—if those consequences are significantly 
negative—consider potential legal changes and their consequences. 
IV 
MARKETS AND (OR FOR) GOVERNANCE 
For the most part, the debates about markets and governance have proceeded 
as if they involve markets on one side and the state on the other. Under that 
assumption, the relevant question is how the latter can or should try to facilitate, 
restrict, or rely on the former. But the relationship need not be so oppositional. 
Sometimes, the exercise of governing authority—or even government itself—can 
be analyzed as a product of market forces, rather than as a means of controlling 
them. 
Analyzing governing authority in market terms does not require one to adopt 
radical libertarianism—none of the articles in this issue do. Nor does it mean that 
the government does, or should, exercise authority only when and how the 
market demands it. Rather, it means thinking about governance as the good that 
is subject to market forces, as well as to legal and political constraints. 
In their article, Rachel Brewster and Sam Buell show how thinking about 
governance in a market frame can help explain an otherwise puzzling legal 
 
 40.  See generally Schwarcz, supra note 23. 
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development: the incredible increase in global anticorruption enforcement over 
the past few decades.41 As they show, the federal government pursued more 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecutions in 2010 alone than it did between 
1977 and 2000, combined. What can account for this dramatic change? 
Brewster and Buell tell a nuanced story that explains the development of this 
market at the global political and domestic professional level. At the global level, 
the emergence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States had to 
be met with changes in international law, economics, and politics. That set the 
stage for active anticorruption enforcement. But the play only began because the 
primary actors—American prosecutors—were also responding to professional 
powers (their traditionally broad discretion, for example) and new incentives 
(such as developments in the American corporate bar). 
Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati make the state itself the subject of analysis.42 
Many of the central challenges in international law arise from bad relationships 
between regions and the nations in which they are located. Some scholars and 
advocates argue for a right of remedial secession for regions facing oppression. 
Should states be able to claim an analogous right of remedial expulsion against 
malefactor regions? If it is an act of self-determination for the people of a region 
to leave a nation against the nation’s wishes, is the same thing true when they 
wish to stay against its wishes? Since acquisition and possession of territory is no 
longer the national priority it once was, can nations simply let go of undesirable 
regions? 
These questions are increasingly pressing. Perhaps the most salient examples 
involve former imperial powers, some of whom would like to discard costly 
colonial outposts whose residents oppose independence. Historically, nations 
have done as they pleased with constituent regions, and particularly their 
colonies.  But do those rules still apply? Can such a position be reconciled with 
the ascendant principle of self-determination? Building on prior work,43 Blocher 
and Gulati propose a framework that would accommodate both principles, 
imposing restrictions on nations seeking to expel regions in most cases, but 
preserving the option of remedial expulsion. 
  
 
 41.  See generally Brewster & Buell, supra note 22. 
 42.  See generally Blocher & Gulati, supra note 25. 
 43.  See also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797 
(2017); Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a 
Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53 (2016); Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence 
R. Helfer, Can Greece be Expelled from the Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule on Expulsion from 
International Organizations, in FILLING THE GAPS IN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EUROPE 127 
(Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2016). 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
From the Great Recession to exponential spikes in the price of a drug,44 to 
the contours and content of political–economic unions,45 to the provision of life-
saving treatments,46 the role that law and legal institutions can and should play in 
shaping markets is one of the most important issues currently confronting 
lawmakers and legal scholars. The other side of the relationship is just as 
important: what role can and should markets play in impacting the law? 
The Law and Markets Project brought together scholars across disciplines to 
explore these issues in depth. In doing so, it forced an explicit consideration of 
the ways in which law and markets intersect, bringing to the fore concepts and 
processes that are often hidden or simply assumed. This symposium issue 
presents important and timely contributions to what we hope and expect will be 
a lively and ongoing scholarly conversation. 
 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-
price-raises-protests.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y4KN-2KLE].  
 45.  See, e.g., Theresa May kicks off Brexit, ECONOMIST (Oct. 2, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21708078-prime-minister-promises-invoke-article-50-end-marc 
h-just-how-hard-brexit [https://perma.cc/A4BU-29F7]. 
 46.  See, e.g., Shmuly Yanklowitz, Give a Kidney, Get a Check, ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/give-a-kidney-get-a-check/412609/ [https://perma. 
cc/N4T7-GUCG]. 
